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Enlisting the Jury in the "War on Drugs": A
Proposed Ban on Prosecutors' Use of "War on
Drugs" Rhetoric During Opening and Closing
Argument of a Narcotics Trial
Mark S. Daviest
Fifty years ago, the Supreme Court held that a prosecutor
may not use rhetoric intended to arouse the "passion and the
prejudice" of jurors.' Prosecutors urging juries to convict a defendant in a narcotics trial, however, often refer to the large government effort against drugs. For example, one prosecutor asked a
jury: "Isn't this [narcotics] case really one about a war? Haven't
they invaded our shores?"2 Arguably, this and other examples3
of prosecutorial drug-related rhetoric4 during opening and closing argument of a narcotics trial are improper under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. 5
Whether prosecutors should be permitted to use drug-related
rhetoric is an important question for three reasons. First, wide
disagreement exists among the courts on this topic. Several
courts have found that drug-related comments constitute permissible courtroom argument,' while other courts have held similar
rhetoric impermissible.7 Furthermore, state courts," military

t B.A. 1992, Yale University; J.D. Candidate 1995, University of Chicago.
Viereck v United States, 318 US 236, 247 (1943).
United States v Bascaro, 742 F2d 1335, 1353 (11th Cir 1984) (holding the comments proper).
' See, for example, Unites States v Solivan, 937 F2d 1146 (6th Cir 1991); State v
Draughn, 76 Ohio App 3d 664, 602 NE2d 790 (1992); Martinez v State, 826 SW2d 807
(Tex Ct App 1992).
' For the purposes of this Comment, the phrase "drug-related rhetoric" refers to any
comments alluding to the general drug problem in the United States. See Part II.
See Part II(A).
See, for example, United States v Ferguson, 935 F2d 1518 (7th Cir 1991); United
States v McFarland, 911 F2d 739 (9th Cir 1990) (unpublished memorandum); United
States v Magee, 821 F2d 234 (5th Cir 1987); Bascaro, 742 F2d at 1335.
' See, for example, Arrieta-Agressot v United States, 3 F3d 525, 527 (1st Cir 1993);
United States v Beasley, 2 F3d 1551 (11th Cir 1993); United States v Johnson, 968 F2d
768 (8th Cir 1992); Solivan, 937 F2d at 1146.
' Compare, for example, State v Echevarria, 71 Wash App 595, 860 P2d 420, 421
(1993) (holding improper prosecutor's reference to "War on Drugs" during his opening
statement) with People v Loferski, 235 111 App 3d 675, 601 NE2d 1135 (1992) (describing a
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courts,9 and even courts within a single jurisdiction' ° disagree

on this issue.
Second, a prohibition on drug-related rhetoric in the courtroom may require the reversal of convictions." A court must
reverse a conviction because of improper prosecutorial comments
unless it deems the error harmless in light of the evidence
against the defendant.12 When defendants are convicted on
closely balanced evidence, a court's decision about the propriety
3
of the prosecutor's comments may form the crux of the appeal.1
Third, and most important, clarifying the line between improper and proper prosecutorial rhetoric is essential to reducing
the pervasive problem of prosecutorial "forensic misconduct.""
prosecutor's rhetoric equating "War on Drugs" to national war permissible as plea for
"fearless administration of the law"). See Draughn, 602 NE2d at 790 (finding the comments improper); People v Williams, 65 Mich App 753, 238 NW2d 186, 187 (1975) (finding
the comments improper); State v Crenshaw, 852 SW2d 181, 187 (Mo Ct App 1993) (finding
the comments proper); People v Peterson, 248 Ill App 3d 28, 618 NE2d 388 (1993) (finding
the comments proper); Martinez, 826 SW2d at 807 (finding the comments proper).
Compare United States v Schomaker, 17 MJ 1122, 1126-27 (NMCMR 1984) (holding improper a reference to Commandant's declaration of "war" on drugs) with United
States v McCarthy, 37 MJ 595, 599 (AFCMR 1993) (holding not improper trial counsel's
comments comparing "America's confrontation with Saddam Hussein" to the "War on
Drugs").
"0 In the Eleventh Circuit, compare Bascaro, 742 F2d at 1354 (stating that "[nlor is it
impermissible 'to simply compare the duties of citizens serving on juries with those of citizens serving in the armed forces'") with Beasley, 2 F3d at 1559-60 (finding it "clearly improper" for the prosecutor twice during his argument to indicate that the jury was a participant in the war on drugs). In the Ninth Circuit, compare McFarland,911 F2d at 739
(holding that comments equating a victory in the "War on Drugs" with a conviction were
not improper) with United States v Bazua.Vizcarra, 927 F2d 611 (9th Cir 1991) (unpublished memorandum) (stating that "diatribes concerning the social ills caused by drug
abuse have no place in a criminal trial"). In Illinois, compare People v Peterson, 248 Ill
App 3d 28, 618 NE2d 388 (1993) ("The prosecutor's remarks relating to the war on drugs
was permissive comment.") with People v Williams, 239 Ill App 3d 575, 607 NE2d 307
(1993) (stating that "we do not approve" of comments remarking that drugs are a "horrible problem in the community"). See also People v Loferski, 601 NE2d 1135, 1145 (Ill App
Ct 1992) (stating that "[a]lthough the analysis in these authorities [finding the rhetoric
improper] is persuasive ... [ilt is the duty of this court to follow the decisions of our Supreme Court").
See, for example, Solivan, 937 F2d at 1155-57; Johnson, 968 F2d at 770-72.
12 See, for example, Solivan, 937 F2d at 1155-57.
See, for example, Ferguson, 935 F2d at 1531 n 5 (refusing to evaluate the evidence
against the defendant because the remark was found proper). This Comment does not
directly address the question of when reversal is appropriate; instead, this Comment
focuses on the prior question of the permissible scope of prosecutors' comments. Of course,
many of the issues involved in assessing the propriety of comments are relevant to the
question of reversal. For example, both the question of propriety and the question of prejudice depend on the "tenor of the social and political environment at the time of the trial . . . ." Note, ProsecutorialMisconduct: The Limitations Upon the Prosecutor'sRole as an
Advocate, 14 Suffolk L Rev 1095, 1121 (1980).
" The phrase "forensic misconduct" was first used in Note, The Nature and Conse-
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Although the debate over the correct solution to this problem continues,15 all of the proposed solutions require the demarcation of
a clear boundary between proper and improper rhetoric.16
This Comment proposes that a court deem improper any use
of "War on Drugs" rhetoric by prosecutors during opening and
closing argument of a narcotics trial.17 Military rhetoric is particularly inappropriate during a narcotics trial. The use of military images to describe the government effort against drugs inappropriately appeals to the emotions of the jury, encourages arbitrary decisions, unfairly invokes the jurors' allegiance to the
government, and disserves the general obligation of the prosecutor to avoid striking rhetorical "foul blows." 8

Part I of this Comment describes the general approaches the
courts have adopted to limit the scope of drug-related prosecutorial rhetoric and discusses the difficulties with these approaches.
Part II explores the current disagreement among the courts over
the propriety of drug-related prosecutorial comments during
opening and closing argument of a narcotics trial. Part III argues
that a court should deem improper prosecutors' use of "War on
Drugs" rhetoric during opening or closing argument of a narcotics
trial.

quences of Forensic Misconduct in the Prosecution of a Criminal Case, 54 Colum L Rev
946 (1954). Since then, many courts and commentators have frequently complained about
the problem of excessive prosecutorial rhetoric. See, for example, Llach v United States,
739 F2d 1322, 1330 (8th Cir 1984); United States v Modica, 663 F2d 1173, 1178-81 (2d Cir
1981); Comment, The Second Circuit Reacts to ProsecutorialMisconduct, 49 Brooklyn L
Rev 1245 (1983); David Crump, The Function and Limits of Prosecution Jury Argument,
28 Sw L J 505 (1974).
" The courts are reluctant to rely on reversal to sanction prosecutors. See, for example, Harry Caldwell, Name Callingat Trial: PlacingParameterson the Prosecutor,8 Am J
Trial Advoc 385, 395 (1985) (stating that "[slociety would bear the costs of retrying the
defendant and the prosecutor would be affected only indirectly"). Many courts and commentators have suggested a variety of alternative solutions, including issuing warnings to
prosecutors, United States v Splain, 545 F2d 1131, 1136 (8th Cir 1976); ordering the prosecutor to show cause why she should not be disciplined, United States v Hasting, 461 US
499, 506 n 5 (1983); referring the attorney to a disciplinary counsel, State v DePew, 38
Ohio St 3d 275, 528 NE2d 542, 557 (1988); rebuking the prosecutor by name in the published opinion, Hasting,461 US at 506 n 5; and forcing the attorney to appear before the
appellate tribunal, Bennett L. Gershman, The Prosecutoras a "Ministerof Justice", 60 NY
State Bar J 8, 64 (May 1988).
"' See Comment, Prosecutors'Deterrence Appeals in State Criminal Trials, 48 U Chi L
Rev 681, 706 (1981) (asserting that "iclear rhetorical standards are the necessary first
step" in reducing instances of excessive rhetoric by prosecutors).
" For the purposes of this Comment, "War on Drugs rhetoric" refers to the use of
military language to describe the government's efforts against narcotics. See Part III.
" See Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935).
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I. PERMISSIBLE SCOPE OF PROSECUTORS' RHETORIC

A.

The Supreme Court's General Approach to Prosecutors'
Rhetoric

9 the leading Supreme
In Berger v United States,"
Court decision addressing improper prosecutorial comments, the Court
reversed a conviction because of a series of improper comments
made by the prosecutor.20 In so doing, the Court articulated the
general standard to which prosecutorial comments must adhere.
Characterizing prosecutors as "representative not of an ordinary
party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty,"2 the Court explained that the government's "interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done."22 The Court noted that a prosecutor's statements are
"apt to carry much weight" in the jury's mind." Accordingly, the
Berger Court announced a standard designed to constrain the
rhetoric of a prosecutor: "[Wihile [the prosecutor] may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones."24
In Viereck v United States,25 the Court applied the Berger
standard to a prosecutor's emotional closing argument.2" During
World War II, Viereck had registered under the Foreign Agents
Registration Act" as "agent and United States correspondent"
for a German newspaper." The government argued that he had
instead financed and written propaganda against British foreign
policy." In his closing argument to the jury, the prosecutor remarked:

'9 295 US 78 (1935). For discussion and criticism of Berger, see Albert W. Alschuler,
Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutorsand Trial Judges, 50 Tex L Rev 629, 635-36 (1972).
20 Specifically, the prosecutor "was guilty of misstating the facts in his cross-examination of witnesses; of putting into the mouths of such witnesses things which they had not
said; of suggesting by his questions that statements had been made to him personally out
of court[;] . ..of bullying and arguing with witnesses; and in general, of conducting himself in a thoroughly indecorous and improper manner." Berger, 295 US at 84.
2

Id at 88.

22

Id.
Id.

23

24 Berger, 295 US at 88.
25 318 US 236 (1943).
2 Id at 247-48.
2' 52 Stat 631 (1938). Adopted just before World War II, the act required "the registration of certain agents of foreign principals." Viereck, 318 US at 237. The purpose of the
act was to help "identify agents of foreign principals who might engage in subversive acts
or in spreading foreign propaganda." Id at 241.
28 Viereck, 318 US at 239.
29 Id at 240.
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This is war. It is a fight to the death. The American
people are relying upon you ladies and gentlemen for
their protection against this sort of a crime, just as
much as they are relying upon the protection of the men
who man the guns in Bataan Peninsula, and everywhere else. They are relying upon you ladies and gentlemen for their protection. We are at war. You have a
duty to perform here. As a representative of your Government
I am calling upon every one of you to do your
30
duty.

Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Stone found that because
"passion and prejudice are heightened by emotions stirred by our
participation in a great war,"3 these comments were "highly
prejudicial" to the defendant's right to a fair trial and "offensive
to the dignity and good order" of the courtroom.32 Quoting from
Berger, the Court stated once again that while the prosecutor
"'may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul
ones."'" Although the Viereck Court reversed the lower court's
decision on other grounds,' the majority stated that these comments alone 3"might well have placed the judgment of conviction
in jeopardy."

The Berger and Viereck decisions were not universally applauded. Judge Learned Hand, whose opinion the Supreme Court
reversed in Berger, believed that the prosecutor's role as advocate
demanded a more lenient approach. Only a few months after the
Berger decision, Judge Hand reiterated his disagreement with
the Berger "foul blows" standard. In United States v Wexler, s
the prosecutor had accused the defendant of spending his life

30 Id at 247 n 3 (paragraph break omitted).
Id at 248.
32 Viereck, 318 US at 248.
Id, quoting Berger, 295 US at 88.
The Court reversed because the lower court improperly applied a version of the
criminal statute that Congress passed after the defendant's registration. Viereck, 318 US
at 247.
' Id. One commentator has suggested that the comments made in Viereck would not
be reversible error under current Supreme Court jurisprudence. Karen E. Holt, Hard
Blows And Foul Ones: The Limited Bounds on ProsecutorialSummation in Tennessee, 58
Tenn L Rev 117, 132 n 107 (1990). Of course, the question of whether a court would reverse a conviction is distinct from the question of whether the court would describe the
remarks as proper. See note 13. No commentator has suggested that the remarks in
Viereck would be accepted as proper by the present Court.
79 F2d 526 (2d Cir 1935).
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"cheating and robbing and assaulting and worse."37 After noting
the recent Berger decision, Judge Hand upheld the conviction,
stating that "[ilt is impossible to expect that 38a criminal trial shall
be conducted without some show of feeling."
In remarks reminiscent of Judge Hand's position in Wexler,
Justices Black and Douglas, dissenting in Viereck, also advocated
a more lenient standard. They argued that although the prosecutor "should not seek to arouse passion or engender prejudice[,] . . . earnestness or even a stirring eloquence cannot convict
him of hitting foul blows." 9 Justice Black quoted approvingly
from an earlier Second Circuit decision that stated: "To shear
him [the prosecutor] of all oratorical emphasis, while leaving
wide latitude to the defense, is to load the scales of justice ... ."4o
B.

Contemporary Criticism of the Berger Standard

Although Berger and Viereck provide some guidance in defining the scope of proper prosecutorial argument, several commentators have complained about the general inadequacy of these
judicial standards.4 ' Professor Albert Alschuler has argued that
while the Berger Court's "hard blows" language is
"[elloquent,... statements at this level of generality do not solve
cases." 2 The Supreme Court itself more recently noted that
"[tihe line separating acceptable from improper advocacy is not
easily drawn. " "
This lack of a precise definition for improper rhetoric has
significantly hindered attempts by various courts to solve the

'7

Id at 530.

3' Id at 529-30. At least one commentator does expect a lack of feeling. See Alschuler,
50 Tex L Rev at 636 (cited in note 19) (stating that "[tihe prosecutor should not think of
oratory as part of his job at all").
"' Viereck, 318 US at 253 (Black dissenting).
4' Id at 253 n 4, quoting Di Carlo v United States, 6 F2d 364, 368 (2d Cir 1925).
41 See, for example, Alschuler, 50 Tex L Rev at 634-35 (cited in note 19) (stating that
"[for] inflammatory argument, and appeals to prejudice ... specific judicial standards are
usually lacking"); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of ProsecutorialTrial Practice:
Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 Vand L Rev 45, 97 n 227 (1991) (stating that "[m]ost
commentators agree that judicial standards defining the limits of oratorical flourish are
lacking"); Note, 14 Suffolk U L Rev at 1106 (cited in note 13) (stating that "[tihe Berger
opinion fails to provide adequate guidance to practicing attorneys or to courts reviewing
the issue of trial misconduct"); Gershman, 60 NY State Bar J at 64 (cited in note 15) (describing the standards as unrealistic).
42 Alschuler, 50 Tex L Rev at 635 (cited in note 19).
4' United States v Young, 470 US 1, 7 (1985).
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problem of prosecutorial forensic misconduct." The absence of
workable standards makes it difficult to teach inexperienced
prosecutors the limited scope of permissible rhetoric and for trial
courts to monitor prosecutors' rhetoric.45 Furthermore, the lack
of specific standards hampers attempts to sanction prosecutors
because it is unclear to appellate courts precisely which comments are improper.

II. THE DISAGREEMENT AMONG COURTS CONCERNING
PROSECUTORS' USE OF DRUG-RELATED RHETORIC DURING
OPENING AND CLOSING ARGUMENT OF A NARCOTICS TRIAL
Both federal and state courts, as well as military courts,
have disagreed on the propriety of prosecutorial comments that
involve drug-related rhetoric. Some courts, including the First,
Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, have found such comments
improper.4" These courts have articulated four reasons for prohibiting such rhetoric. First, the prosecutor's role as a representative of the state makes rhetoric about the general drug problem
inappropriate. Second, such comments may unfairly invoke the
jurors' allegiance to the government. Third, the current social attitudes about drugs make any mention of the larger drug problem inflammatory. Fourth, because evidence of society's war on
drugs is irrelevant to determining a defendant's guilt,
prosecutors' use of drug-related rhetoric during opening and
closing argument is similarly improper.
By contrast, the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have held
that prosecutorial allusions to the larger government effort
against illicit drugs are proper.47 These courts have used four
different arguments to justify the use of drug-related rhetoric.
'

See note 14.

4' In Viereck, the Court noted that "[wie think that the trial judge should have
stopped counsel's discourse without waiting for an objection." Viereck, 318 US at 248.
More recently, the Court has written: "We emphasize that the trial judge has the responsibility to maintain decorum in keeping with the nature of the proceeding." Young, 470
US at 10. Defense attorneys are often reluctant to object to excessive rhetoric for fear that
in doing so they may emphasize those remarks to the jury. See Caldwell, 8 Am J Trial
Advoc at 391-92 (cited in note 15).
4 Arrieta-Agressot v United States, 3 F3d 525 (1st Cir 1993); United States v Beasley,
2 F3d 1551 (11th Cir 1993); United States v Johnson, 968 F2d 768 (8th Cir 1992); United
States v Solivan, 937 F2d 1146 (6th Cir 1991). See also United States v Barlin, 686 F2d 81
(2d Cir 1982); United States v Hawkins, 595 F2d 751, 754 (DC Cir 1978). But see United
States v Bascaro, 742 F2d 1335, 1353 (11th Cir 1984).
" United States v Ferguson, 935 F2d 1518 (6th Cir 1991); United States v McFarland,
911 F2d 739 (9th Cir 1990) (unpublished memorandum); United States v Magee, 821 F2d
234 (5th Cir 1987).
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First, because the jury acts as the conscience of the community,
the prosecutor must be permitted to remind it of the
government's efforts to reduce drug use in the community. Second, because prosecutors may comment on the gravity of the
charged crime, reference to this country's drug problem is relevant. Third, these comments are consistent with urging the jurors to perform the difficult task of enforcing the law. Fourth,
courts have justified drug-related rhetoric when the prosecutor
used the comments to refute defense counsel comments critical of
government narcotics prosecutions.
A.

Courts Holding Prosecutors' Use of Drug-Related Comments
Improper

Prosecutors' use of drug-related rhetoric has been found
improper for any one of four reasons. First, several courts have
stated that the obligation of the prosecutor to function as more
than simply an advocate for conviction requires her to refrain
from making these comments. These courts have generally referred to Berger for guidance regarding this prosecutorial obligation. For example, in United States v Solivan," the Sixth Circuit
considered the propriety of the prosecutor's remark: "I am asking
you to tell her and all of the other drug dealers like her ... [t]hat
we don't want that stuff in Northern Kentucky."" The Solivan
court quoted extensively from Berger regarding the role of the
prosecutor"0 and concluded that the prosecutor's obligation under Berger to avoid foul blows51 prohibits drug-related rhetoric.
Other courts have adopted this reasoning."
The second argument for disallowing drug-related rhetoric is
that such language implicitly calls upon the patriotism of thejurors. In United States v Schomaker," the military court reversed a conviction because the prosecuting attorney stated in
argument that "the Commandant [of the Marine Corps] has de-

'8 937 F2d 1146 (6th Cir 1991).
50

Id at 1148.
Id at 1150-52.

'1

Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935).

49

62 See, for example, State v Draughn, 76 Ohio App 3d 664, 602 NE2d 790, 793-96

(1992); Johnson, 968 F2d at 771. See also State v Echevarria, 71 Wash App 595, 860 P2d
420, 422 (1993) (not relying on Berger but on "his or her [the prosecutor's) position as a
'quasi-judicial officer'"). This concern for the proper decorum of a prosecutor is occasionally
expressed as an ethical consideration. See People v Loferski, 235 Ill App 3d 675, 601 NE2d
1135, 1145 (1992). See generally Carol A. Corrigan, On ProsecutorialEthics, 13 Hastings
Const L Q 537 (1986); Zacharias, 44 Vand L Rev at 45 (cited in note 41).
3 17 MJ 1122 (NMCCMR 1984).
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clared a war on drugs...

."4

The court required a new sentenc-

ing hearing because it feared that the "issue of command influence" had undermined the fairness of the trial.55 The court noted that because military personnel decide the appropriate penalty
for the defendant, reference to command policy could lead the
military jurors to believe that it was their duty to sentence the
defendant harshly. 6
Outside of military courts, prosecutors' comments that remind citizens of the government's efforts against drugs may call
upon the jury's allegiance to the government in much the same
way that allusions to a command policy call upon the allegiance
of the military officers.57 The Supreme Court recently
rearticulated the Berger concern about the influence of the prosecutor: "[Tihe prosecutor's opinion carries with it the imprimatur
of the Government and may induce the jury to trust the
Government's judgment rather than its own view of the evidence."" Applying this Berger notion in the narcotics context,
one court described a prosecutor's drug-related rhetoric as "urging jurors to enlist in the war on drugs."" In both the military
and civilian trial, the prosecutor's drug-related rhetoric reminds
the "neutral" decisionmaker of an important policy stance held by
an authority to which the decisionmaker owes allegiance.
The third argument in support of prohibiting drug-related
rhetoric is that the current social and political environment renders most comments about drugs highly prejudicial. For example,
in People v Williams, ° a Michigan court held a prosecutor's
comments referring to the general drug problem 1 impermissible
because in "such an emotion-laden situation, sensibilities are
easily inflamed." 2 The court's goal was to prevent the jurors

Id at 1126.
Id at 1124.

Id. See also United States v Grady, 15 MJ 275, 276 (CMA 1983).
"
One commentator has attributed the start of the United States' extensive effort
against drugs to President Reagan's October 2, 1982 radio speech given in response to the
House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control urging the President to "declare
war on drugs." Steven Wisotsky, Crackdown: The Emerging "DrugException" to the Bill of
Rights, 38 Hastings L J 889, 890-892 (1987). Thus, jurors may believe that the President
has called on them to help in the "War on Drugs."
United States v Young, 470 US 1, 18-19 (1985), citing Berger, 295 US at 88-89.
" Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F3d at 527.
o 65 Mich App 753, 238 NW2d at 186 (1975).
"
The prosecutor made the following comments: "Ladies and gentlemen of the Jury,
you have an opportunity to effect [sic] the drug traffic in this city. You have a voice. You
have a chance to use it." Id at 187.
612 Id at 188.
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from deciding the case "on the basis of their desire to alleviate
the drug problem." 3
Fourth, some courts have asserted that drug-related rhetoric
is beyond the proper scope of opening or closing argument because evidence of the larger effort against drugs is not presented
5 adopted
at trial.6 4 An Ohio appeals court in State v Draughn"
this "beyond the evidence" approach. The court held that although a prosecutor should argue strongly for conviction, she
"may not invite the jury to judge the case upon standards or
grounds other than the evidence and law of the case." 6 Under
this standard, the court held that comments mentioning the
"drug crack cocaine problem in this county" and the "young,
brave men on our [local police unit]" 7 were "clearly and flagrantly improper."68
B.

Courts Holding Prosecutors' Use of Drug-Related Comments
Proper

Some courts and commentators have suggested that those
courts that permit the prosecutor a wide scope of permissible
argument have been motivated more by respect for precedent
than by principled argument. 9 These courts, however, have articulated four grounds for upholding the use of drug-related rhetoric. Arguably, each of these grounds is simply a different manifestation of the concern expressed by Judge Hand in Wexler and

'3 Id. See Hawkins, 595 F2d at 754 ("Nor is the prosecutor at liberty to substitute
emotion for evidence by equating, directly or by innuendo, a verdict of guilty to a blow
against the drug problem."); United States u Bazua.Vizcarra, 927 F2d 611 (9th Cir 1991)
("Diatribes concerning the social ills caused by drug abuse have no place in a criminal trial .... [They] suggest to the jury that a conviction will somehow contribute to the 'War on
drugs.'"). Another court noted that '[emotional] appeals encourage the jury to convict a
defendant 'not only for what he had done but for what other thieves and criminals were
doing.'" United States v Monaghan, 741 F2d 1434, 1441 n 31 (DC Cir 1984), quoting
Brown v Estelle, 468 F Supp 42, 48 (N D Tex 1978).
" See Caldwell, 8 Am J Trial Advoc at 386 (cited in note 15) (stating that "[the propriety of the remark depends upon whether it is supported by the evidence submitted at
trial"). See also Thomas v United States, 619 A2d 20, 24 (DC App 1992) (vacated for rehearing en banc), citing Irick v United States, 565 A2d 26, 36 (DC App 1989).
' 76 Ohio App 3d 664, 602 NE2d 790 (1942).
66 Id at 793.
17

Id at 795.

Id.
"4 See, for example, Loferski, 601 NE2d at 1145 (observing that "cases that permit
these remarks generally fail to articulate a rationale beyond the bald statement that such
rhetoric has always been accepted"); Comment, 48 U Chi L Rev at 688 (cited in note 16).
6'

395]
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by the Viereck dissenters that a prosecutor's oratory not be too
restricted.
Three primary arguments for permitting prosecutorial use of
drug-related rhetoric hinge on the prosecutor's need to urge the
jury to perform its duty. First, some courts have permitted such
rhetoric because the rhetoric appropriately reminds the jury to
serve as the conscience of the community. In United States v
Magee," for example, the Fifth Circuit found the drug-related
rhetoric of the prosecutor proper,7 1 holding that the comments
were simply a "suggestion by the prosecutor that the jury fulfill
its role as the conscience of the community."72
A second justification for the use of drug-related rhetoric is
that the rhetoric merely emphasizes the gravity of the
defendant's alleged narcotics crime. This rationale underlies the
Seventh Circuit's decision in United States v Ferguson.73 In
Ferguson, the prosecutor argued:
[N]obody has to tell you about the scourge of drugs in
our society today and the effect it is having on the social fabric today .... You may hear that people, individual people, don't have a chance to make a difference in
the fight against drugs.... Detective Boyle, a fine law
enforcement officer, stopped it. Here is your chance to
do something.74
The Seventh Circuit held this comment proper, describing the
rhetoric as a mere comment to the jury on the "gravity of this
country's drug problem."75
Third, some courts have permitted the drug-related rhetoric
as a plea to the jury to enforce the law. For example, in Martinez
v State,7" the prosecutor stated about the police: "They're fight-

'0 821 F2d 234 (5th Cir 1987).
"' The prosecutor argued that "it's common knowledge that we got a drug problem in
this United States.... [Wihen are they going to do something about this drug smuggling? ... [H]ave your foreman sign a guilty verdict. That's the way to do something
about drugs." Id at 242.
72

Id.

71 935 F2d 1518 (7th Cir 1991).

74Id at 1530.
71 Id at 1530-31, quoting United States v Zanin, 831 F2d 740, 743 (7th Cir 1987). The

court stated that "[tihe government permissibly asked jurors to make a difference in the
fight against this significant evil." Ferguson, 935 F2d at 1531. Several other courts have

adopted similar reasoning. See Malley v Manson, 547 F2d 25, 28 (2d Cir 1976); People v
Peterson, 248 111App 3d 28, 618 NE2d 388, 396 (1993). But see Arrieta-Agressot, 3 F3d at
527-28 (disapproving of the Ferguson decision).
71 826 SW2d 807 (Tex Ct App 1992).
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ing the war on drugs and they're working hard.... They're our
first line of defense in this war on drugs."77 The Texas court
found no error because the prosecutor was "making a plea for law
enforcement,"7 8 and it held that such a plea can permissibly describe the "respective parts played in that [drug] war by the police, prosecutors, court and jury."7 9 Several other state courts
have also relied on this rationale. s
A fourth justification for allowing some prosecutorial comments about drugs is that these comments are permissible as a
rebuttal to certain defense counsel arguments. For example, in
United States v Bascaro,8 1 the prosecutor asked the jury: "Isn't
this case really one about a war? Haven't they invaded our
shores?" 2 The Eleventh Circuit ruled these comments permissible in light of the defense counsel's accusation that the government had no legitimate reason to prosecute the defendant."
III. PROHIBITING "WAR ON DRUGS" RHETORIC DURING OPENING
AND CLOSING ARGUMENT OF A NARCOTICS TRIAL
A court should seek to eliminate the use of "War on Drugs"
rhetoric by prosecutors during opening and closing argument of a
narcotics trial. A court holding drug-related rhetoric impermissible' should be particularly concerned about the use of military
rhetoric during a narcotics trial. Moreover, a court allowing drugrelated rhetoric 5 should nevertheless restrict the use of "War on
Drugs" rhetoric because the justifications for allowing drug-relat-

"

78

Id at 808.

Id.

79 Id.
80 See,

for example, State v Crenshaw, 852 SW2d 181, 187 (Mo Ct App 1993) (stating
that "the Prosecutor alluded to the 'drug war' in the United States, [and] the efforts of
police to catch the culprits 'on the battlefields of our streets[.]'"); Petirson, 618 NE2d at
395 (stating that "[t]he prosecutor's remarks relating to the war on drugs was permissive
comment on the evils of crime and fearless administration of justice and, therefore, did
not constitute prosecutorial misconduct"); Loferski, 601 NE2d at 1145; State v Plummer,
860 SW2d 340, 351 (Mo Ct App 1993); State v Hatcher, 835 SW2d 340, 344-45 (Mo Ct App
1992).
81 742 F2d 1335, 1353 (11th Cir 1984).
82 Id at 1353.
8
Id at 1353-54. See also United States v Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1189 (1st Cir 1993)
(permitting the prosecution to refer to the "War on Drugs" after defense attorneys had
introduced the phrase); United States v Smith, 918 F2d 1551 (11th Cir 1990); United
States v Lee, 743 F2d 1240 (8th Cir 1984).
See Part II(A).
85 See Part II(B).
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ed comments do not apply to the unique problems of military
rhetoric.
In order to reduce the use of "War on Drugs" rhetoric, a
court should forbid prosecutors' invocation of the "metaphors and
images of battle" 6 to describe the government effort against illegal drugs. This per se prohibition is easy to apply, is not easily
evaded, will improve the training of prosecutors, and applies to a
significant number of cases. The prosecutor should not be permitted to use "War on Drugs" rhetoric even in response to defense
counsel's use of such rhetoric.
A. "War on Drugs" Rhetoric Should Not be Used by Prosecutors
During Opening and Closing Argument of Narcotics Trials
1. The dangers of prosecutors'use of military rhetoric.
Courts have recognized that rhetoric invoking the metaphors
and images of battle is a particularly inappropriate form of prosecutorial argument. In Viereck, the Supreme Court emphasized
that the military rhetoric at issue was "offensive to the dignity
and good order with which all proceedings in court should be
conducted."8 7 Although the Supreme Court has never directly
addressed the question of the propriety of military rhetoric in a
narcotics trial, Viereck serves as powerful precedent for disallowing such rhetoric.
The unique danger posed by using military analogies was
also addressed in the review of capital sentencing hearings in
Brooks v Francis," Brooks v Kemp, 9 and Hance v Zant.'
These cases examined the propriety of almost identical summations that included an "extended analogy between jurors and soldiers":9
Well, I say to you that we're in a war again in this
country, except it's not a foreign nation, it's against the
criminal element in this country, that's who we're at
war with, and they are winning the war[.] ... And, if
we can send a seventeen-year old young man overseas
to kill an enemy soldier, is it asking too much to ask

The quoted language is from United States v Salas, 879 F2d 530, 541 (9th Cir
1989) (Ferguson concurring in part and dissenting in part).
'
Viereck u United States, 318 US 236, 247-48 (1943).
716 F2d 780 (11th Cir 1983).
8' 762 F2d 1383 (11th Cir 1985) (en banc).
"
696 F2d 940 (lth Cir 1983).
Brooks v Kemp, 762 F2d at 1396.
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you to go back and vote for the death penalty in this
case .... I submit to you that he's an enemy, and he's a
member of the criminal element, and he's our enemy.2
The court in Brooks v Francis found only isolated portions of the
remarks improper. 3 In particular, the court stated: "We doubt
that it is improper to simply compare the duties of citizens serving on juries with those of citizens serving in the armed forces."9 4 In Hance, the court found very similar comments improper
because they were a "dramatic appeal to gut emotion [that] has
no place in the courtroom."9 5
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed the Francis decision en banc
in Brooks v Kemp. Although the majority concluded that the "war
on crime" analogy was "troubling" and improper, it nonetheless
found that the comments did not require a new sentencing hearing and thus upheld the Francis court's decision. In doing so,
however, the Francis court noted that the role of a neutral and
independent jury is "simply not analogous to the role of a soldier
who is ordered to kill the enemy."" The court thought that the
principal flaw in the metaphor was that it masked the jury's
power to make independent judgments. 8
Judge Johnson, the author of Hance, believed that the comments justified a new sentencing hearing and thus dissented
from the en banc opinion in Kemp.99 In particular, Judge Johnson argued that the majority had insufficiently considered the
danger of military rhetoric in the courtroom:
[Tihe suggestion that a "war" has been declared, and
the attendant implication that jurors have a "duty" to
fight it, removes from the jury the sense of responsibility for their decision .... And the evocation of a pitched
battle ... encourages the jury to reach its decision in a
frenzied and emotional atmosphere which invites arbi-

92 Id at 1396-97. Defendant Hance was executed in Georgia on April 1, 1994. Peter
Applebome, Georgia Executes Murderers After Brief Stay From Court, NY Times A14 (Apr
1, 1994). Defendant Brooks received a life sentence. Brooks v State, 262 Ga 187, 415 SE2d
903 (1992).
"3 Brooks v Francis,716 F2d at 789.
94 Id.
" Hance, 696 F2d at 952.
Brooks v Kemp, 762 F2d at 1414-15.
'7
"

Id at 1412.
Id at 1413.

Id at 1426 (Johnson dissenting).
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trariness in judgment.... [This is] a jury that has been
goaded into a froth of patriotic duty.'0°
Although the majority in Brooks acknowledged that the military
analogy was improper because it misconstrued the jury's power of
discretion,' Judge Johnson thought that the "war on crime"
analogy was so "fundamentally unfair" that a new sentencing
hearing was required. 10 2
2. The dangers of prosecutors' use of military rhetoric during
opening and closing argument of narcotics trials.
As described in Part II(A) of this Comment, many courts
have found drug-related rhetoric improper. These courts have
argued that the role of the prosecutor, the role of the jury, current social attitudes, and the "beyond the evidence" limitation on
argument require prosecutors to refrain from drug-related rhetoric. Viereck, the Kemp majority, and the Kemp dissent articulate
strong arguments regarding the unique dangers presented by the
use of military rhetoric in the courtroom. Combining the concerns
about drug-related rhetoric with these concerns about military
rhetoric produces four powerful reasons to forbid prosecutors' use
of "War on Drugs" rhetoric during a narcotics trial.
First, describing the government effort against narcotics as a
"war" increases the inflammatory nature of drug-related comments. In Viereck, the Court believed that military language
reminding jurors of the ongoing war against Germany could incite the "passion and prejudice" of a jury deciding the fate of a
German citizen.' 3 Similarly, the court in Williams deemed the
drug-related comments improper because "sensibilities are easily
inflamed."0 4 When prosecutors in a narcotics trial use military
rhetoric to describe the ongoing "battle" against drugs, the combined use of military and drug-related rhetoric may create a
"frenzied and emotional atmosphere" around the trial.0 5

'0 Brooks v Kemp, 762 F2d at 1430 (Johnson dissenting).
10 Id at 1412.

" Id at 1426 (Johnson dissenting).
M03Viereck, 318 US at 247-48.
People v Williams, 65 Mich App 753, 238 NW2d 186 (1975).
105Brooks v Kemp, 762 F2d at 1430 (Johnson dissenting). The Solivan court reasoned

that because comments referring to World War II were impermissible under Viereck, comments referring to society's current problems with drugs are, given "[tihe wider social-political context" of "an ongoing crisis, popularly termed the 'War on Drugs," also impermissible. United States v Solivan, 937 F2d 1146, 1152-53 (6th Cir 1991). In Solivan, the
prosecutors did not use "War on Drugs" rhetoric. Id at 1148-49.
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Second, prosecutorial use of "War on Drugs" rhetoric may
unfairly call upon the jurors' allegiance to the government. In
Viereck, the prosecutor argued: "We are at war. You have a duty
to perform here. As a representative of your Government I am
0 6 Similarly, in
calling upon every one of you to do your duty.""
°7
United States v Beasley," the prosecutor stated: "I want to say
a few words about... [the] war on drugs ....You've got a place
in that war."' 8 The military rhetoric and drug-related rhetoric
combined once again, this time arguably creating a jury "goaded
into a froth of patriotic duty.""0 9
Third, "War on Drugs" rhetoric alludes to facts beyond the
evidence admitted at trial. The court in Draughn found drugrelated comments improper because the facts of the larger drug
problem were not presented as evidence in the trial.10 Similarly, facts supporting the accurate use of "War on Drugs" language
to describe the government's efforts against drugs are inadmissible at trial because this country is not literally at war with

drugs."'
Fourth, the use of both military and drug-related rhetoric is
evidence that a prosecutor is shirking her general duty under
Berger to ensure "that justice shall be done."' One commentator has suggested that excessive advocacy often results when a
prosecutor "consider[s] himself [or herselfl engaged in a war
against crime in which no holds are barred in the struggle to
overcome powerful, unscrupulous opposition."" 3 For example, in

Viereck, 318 US at 247-48 n 3.
107 2 F3d 1551 (11th Cir 1993).

Id at 1559-60.
Brooks v Kemp, 762 F2d at 1430.
"o State v Draughn,76 Ohio App 3d 664, 602 NE2d 790 (1992).
.. Some legal observers have argued that we are literally at war with drugs. See
Wisotsky, 38 Hastings L J 889 (cited in note 57). In announcing her decision to request
the assistance of the National Guard to help quell drug-related violence in the District of
Columbia, Mayor Sharon Pratt Kelly declared, "We've got a war on our hands." B.
Drummond Ayres Jr., Washington Mayor Seeks Aid of Guard in Combating Crime, NY
Times Al (Oct 23, 1993). Several prosecutors have literally equated the war on drugs with
the recent operations against Iraq. See Blocher v Fonville, 756 F Supp 306, 308 (S D Tex
1991); People v Peterson, 248 Ill App 3d 28, 618 NE2d 388, 395 (1993); State v Echevarria,
71 Wash App 595, 860 P2d 420, 421 n 1 (1993). See also United States v McCarthy, 37 MJ
595, 599 (AFCMR 1993). In the opinion of at least one commentator, the "legal system is
evolving to take the paramilitary rhetoric of the War on Drugs at face value." Wisotsky,
38 Hastings L J at 925 (cited in note 57). Of course, if this country is literally at war with
drugs, then the precedential value of Viereck, which was decided during World War II, is
even stronger.
2 Berger v United States, 295 US 78, 88 (1935).
Note, 54 Colum L Rev at 948 (cited in note 14).
"'
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Beasley, the prosecutor stated that "this [trial] is just another
battle in that war [on drugs].... Now, I've got a place in that
war."114 The prosecutor combined military and drug-related
rhetoric to portray himself as a soldier against drugs. Although
the use of either military or drug-related rhetoric arguably violates the Berger foul blows standard, the combination of the two
forms of rhetoric almost certainly violates this standard.
3. Courts that allow drug-related rhetoric should nonetheless
disallow "War on Drugs" rhetoric.
The courts that have permitted certain forms of drug-related
rhetoric have often failed to consider the unique dangers posed
by the use of military rhetoric during narcotics trials. In State v
Hatcher,"5 the prosecutor argued that "there is a war against
drugs going on in this country and I think the way you win a war
is you fight each battle one at a time and this is obviously a
battle." 18 The court held the comments proper because arguments of the "same type" had previously been approved." 7
None of the cases relied upon by the Hatcher court, however,
had involved military rhetoric. The court cited State v Williams,"' where the prosecutor argued that "[dirugs are ruining
this country,"" 9 and State v Holt,2 ' where the court did not
mention any use of military rhetoric. 21 In citing these cases,
the Hatcher court completely ignored the unique dangers of military rhetoric.122
A court permitting prosecutors to use drug-related rhetoric
need not permit the use of military language during a narcotics
trial. Some courts have asserted that drug-related rhetoric should
be permitted because it helps the jury to enforce the law, to perform its role as conscience of the community, and to assess the
gravity of the crime. These arguments do not, however, require a
court to permit "War on Drugs" rhetoric.

..
4 United States v Beasley, 2 F3d 1551, 1559-60 (11th Cir 1993).
15

835 SW2d 340 (Mo Ct App 1992).

Id at 344.
Id.
18 747 SW2d 635 (Mo Ct App 1988).
'"
Id at 638.
o 660 SW2d 735 (Mo Ct App 1983).
121 Id at 738.
12 For a similar example, see McFarland,911 F2d at 739 (describing the use of "War
"'

117

on Drugs" rhetoric as "undramatic").
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First, because military rhetoric "removes from the jury the
sense of responsibility for their decision,"123 this rhetoric does
not encourage a jury to take seriously its role as enforcer of the
law. Second, the "war" metaphor undermines the goal of encouraging the jury to act as the conscience of the community because
it "invites arbitrariness in judgment."12 4 Third, other suitable
methods exist for a prosecutor to highlight the gravity of the
nation's drug problem. One such method is for a prosecutor to
describe the drug problem in this country as a social, medical, or
moral problem." 5 Thus, even a court that is sympathetic to
Wexler and wishes to permit the prosecutor a large amount of
rhetorical freedom should prohibit "War on Drugs" rhetoric.
Some courts have allowed prosecutors to use drug-related
rhetoric only in response to defense counsel comments critical of
government actions. Although these defense comments no doubt
prompt the prosecutor to defend government policy, the comments do not require the use of military language. Once again,
the prosecutor can use medical, social, or moral imagery to defend the government's policies. Defense counsel comments critical
of government narcotics policy may justify prosecutorial use of
drug-related rhetoric as a response, but the comments do not
justify permitting "War on Drugs" rhetoric.'2 8
B.

A Court Should Hold Improper Any Use of "War on Drugs"
Rhetoric by Prosecutors During Opening and Closing
Argument of a Narcotics Trial

1. The proposed rule.
A court should hold improper any use of "War on Drugs"
rhetoric by prosecutors during opening and closing argument of a
narcotics trial.'2 7 "War on Drugs" rhetoric should be defined as
speech "invoking the metaphors and images of battle" 2 ' to describe the government's efforts against narcotics and should be
held improper per se. This rule avoids the problem of generality

23 Brooks v Kemp, 762 F2d at 1430 (Johnson dissenting).

Id at 1430 (Johnson dissenting).
.25See Paul Finkelman, The Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on
124

Drugs, 66 S Cal L Rev 1389, 1390 n 6 (1993).
1" See Part III(B)(3).
127 The courts possess the power to prescribe rules that govern the scope of a
prosecutor's rhetoric. See Donnelly v DeChristoforo,416 US 637, 648 n 23 (1974). See also
Young, 470 US at 24 n 3 (Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part).
12' The quoted language is from United States v Salas, 879 F2d 530, 541 (9th Cir
1989) (Ferguson concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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hindering the Berger foul blows standard and imposes a brightline standard prohibiting the use of a specific and easily recognizable class of rhetoric.
Several of the cases discussed earlier illustrate how a ban on
"War on Drugs" rhetoric would operate. For example, the comments at issue in Martinez v State19 are clearly military rhetoric: "They're fighting the war on drugs and they're working
hard.... They're

our first line of defense in this war on

drugs." 3 ' Similarly, the rhetoric challenged in United States v
Bascaro' is also military rhetoric: "Isn't this case really one
about a war? Haven't they invaded our shores?"'32 Thus, a court
would find both of these comments improper under the proposed
rule.
Of course, occasional borderline cases will arise. For example, in Johnson, the court addressed the propriety of a comment
that described the jury as a "bulwark" against an increase in
drug use.'33 Although close to qualifying, this word probably
does not constitute the use of military rhetoric because it does
not explicitly invoke the image of battle. The word "bulwark" is
not inflammatory, does not directly call upon the allegiance of
jurors, and does not suggest that the prosecutor has abandoned
her duty under Berger.
The prosecutor's remarks in Ferguson probably do constitute
military rhetoric. There the prosecutor argued that "[the jurors]
have a chance to make a difference in the fight against
drugs."'34 This rhetoric employs a fighting metaphor to describe
government policy against drugs. Urging the jury to participate
in the "fight" is inflammatory, calls upon the allegiance of jurors,
and suggests that the prosecutor may have disregarded her
Berger duty. Accordingly, the proposed ban on "War on Drugs"
rhetoric would include the remarks in Ferguson.
An important characteristic of the proposed rule is that it
governs the propriety of the comments and not the extent of
prejudice actually suffered by the defendant.'35 If a great deal
of doubt exists about whether military rhetoric was used to describe the government's efforts against drugs, then it is unlikely

1- Martinez, 826 SW2d at 807.
0' Id at 808.

131
132
'

13
'3

United States v Bascaro, 742 F2d 1335 (11th Cir 1984).
Id at 1353.
United States v Johnson, 968 F2d 768, 769 (8th Cir 1992).
United States v Ferguson, 935 F2d 1518, 1530 (7th Cir 1991).
See note 13.
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that the "War on Drugs" language was sufficiently prejudicial to
warrant reversal or any other form of judicial response."'
The proposed rule does not apply to all drug-related rhetoric.
For example, the comments in Solivan do not invoke military
metaphors: "I'm asking you to tell her and all of the other drug
dealers like her ...[tihat we don't want that stuff in Northern
Kentucky."'37 The proposed rule neither prohibits nor protects
such comments. Instead, a court would continue to judge these
comments under the existing standards that generally govern
prosecutorial comments. 3 8
2. The practicalstrengths of the proposed rule.
The proposed rule has three significant advantages: the rule
would not be easily evaded; it would improve the training of
prosecutors; and it would resolve a significant number of cases.
The proposed rule would not be easily evaded for two reasons.
First, unlike other possible rules aimed at constraining prosecutorial rhetoric, this rule would not be undermined when a prosecutor conveyed a similar message but used language that did not
technically violate the rule. For example, a prosecutor could
evade a prohibition on calling a defendant a "drunk" by instead
stating that the defendant was "always drinking liquor." A prosecutor would not similarly be able to evade the ban on military
rhetoric. In fact, if a prosecutor were to evade the rule by using
other rhetoric to imply the same point, a primary purpose of the
rule-to eliminate the unique dangers posed by the use of military rhetoric-would be satisfied.
Second, the rule would not be easily evaded because the rule
would allow the. trial courts to monitor the prosecutor's rhetoric
more closely. The Court in Viereck commented: "We think that
the trial judge should have stopped counsel's discourse without
waiting for an objection."' 39 Under the general foul blows standard of Berger, however, the courts have lacked specific guidance
about when to stop prosecutors' rhetoric. A trial court in a jurisdiction adopting the proposed ban on "War on Drugs" rhetoric
would know immediately that certain prosecutorial rhetoric is

" Compare the prosecutor's use of the term "bulwark," Johnson, 968 F2d at 769, with
the rhetoric, "Isn't this case really one about a war?," Bascaro, 742 F2d at 1353.
137 Solivan, 937 F2d at 1148.
'
'3'

See Part I(A).
Viereck, 318 US at 248.
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improper and would be able to take any of the suggested curative
steps. 140
The proposed rule would also improve the training that prosecutors receive regarding the proper scope of argument at trial.
In Arrieta-Agressot v United States,1 4' for example, the court
found improper "several paragraphs of 150-proof rhetoric,""'
and it blamed "those who superintend young prosecutors in the
district in question" for the inexperienced prosecutor's errors in
the case.4 3 The blame, however, may well lie in part with the
courts, which have been unable to formulate a test that allows
prosecutors to determine which comments are impermissible. By
contrast, the proposed rule clearly describes one form of rhetoric
that is improper and would make training about this particular
form of rhetoric straightforward.
Significantly, the rule would affect a large number of cases.
As Part II of this Comment illustrates, military language has
been invoked during many narcotics trials. The frequent use of
the "War on Drugs" metaphor in public' discourse, combined
with the frequency of drug arrests,'4 5 suggests that the metaphor will continue to be used by prosecutors for some time. The
rules governing public political dialogue, however, are different
from the rules governing proper courtroom argument. 4 ' An explicit ban on "War on Drugs" rhetoric during narcotics trials
would aid prosecutors and courts in remembering and observing
this important difference.

"4

See note 15.

(1st Cir 1993).
Id at 530. The comments were: "They are soldiers in the army of evil, in the army
which only purpose [sic] is to poison, to disrupt, to corrupt." Id at 527.
141 3 F3d 525
142

"4

Id at 530.

The phrase "War on Drugs" is omnipresent in current political debate. For example, the Chicago Tribune used the phrase fifty-seven times during 1993 and 886 times
between January 1985 and May 1994. The frequency was determined by conducting a
Westlaw search for the term "War on Drugs" in the CHITRIB database. Five Supreme
Court justices have used the phrase. See Bostick, 111 S Ct at 2394 (Marshall dissenting);
Florida v Bostick, 111 S Ct 2382, 2389 (1991) (O'Connor majority opinion); California v
Acevedo, 111 S Ct 1982, 2002 (1991) (Stevens dissenting); Employment Division v Smith,
110 S Ct 1595, 1617 (1990) (Blackmun dissenting); National Treasury Employees Union v
Von Raab, 489 US 656, 686 (1989) (Scalia dissenting).
14' According to the the United States Government, over one million people
were arrested for drug abuse violations in 1991. Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics-1992, Table 4.1 at 422 (1993).
"' The boundaries of acceptable public speech are, of course, governed primarily by
the First Amendment. See Geoffrey R. Stone, The Rules of Evidence and the Rules of Public Debate, 1993 U Chi Legal F 127.
1
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3. The proposed rule should apply regardless of the rules
that govern defense counsel rhetoric.
In a very small number of cases, defense counsel has initiated the use of "War on Drugs" rhetoric. For example, in United
States v Smith, 47 the court found the use of military rhetoric by
the prosecutor proper because the defense counsel accused the
14
government of taking an "atomic bomb approach" to the case.
Although it may seem sensible to ban the use of "War on Drugs"
rhetoric by defense counsel as well, 4 1 the prosecutor should be
prohibited from using the "War on Drugs" rhetoric regardless of
the rules governing defense counsel.
First, as the Supreme Court explained in United States v
Young,15 defense counsel comments do not make a "responsein-kind" proper. 1 ' The Young Court stated: "[Tihe issue is not
the prosecutor's license to make otherwise improper arguments,
but whether the prosecutor's 'invited response,' taken in context,
unfairly prejudiced the defendant." 5 ' A court should not use
this rationale to transform "otherwise improper arguments" into
proper ones.'53 Thus, defense counsel's use of "War on Drugs"
rhetoric does not make proper the prosecutor's use of such rheto51 4
ric in response.
Second, defense attorneys frequently use "War on Drugs"
rhetoric for a different reason than prosecutors. In particular,
defense counsel may use the military metaphor to reduce the
level of emotion surrounding a trial. For example, in State v
McKeehan,'5 5 defense counsel argued: "Just because somebody
has termed it a drug war does not mean that martial law has
been imposed .... She does still have her constitutionally guaranteed rights."'56 This use of "War on Drugs" rhetoric attempts
to reduce the emotions in the courtroom by refuting, not emphasizing, the military analogy.'5 7 This use of rhetoric differs from
918 F2d 1551 (11th Cir 1990).
Id at 1562. See also United States v Sepulveda, 15 F3d 1161, 1189 (1st Cir 1993)
(permitting, though not approving, the use of "war on drugs" language in response to
defense counsel's use of military rhetoric).
M9 The rules governing limitations on defense counsel argument are beyond the scope
of this Comment.
'
United States v Young, 470 US 1 (1985).
Id at 12.
47

141

162

Id.

15 Id.

" Of course, the "invited response" doctrine may affect the likelihood of finding preju-

dicial error as well as provide a reason to limit any sanction visited on the prosecutor.
'55824 SW2d 152 (Mo Ct App 1992).
"' Id at 155.
157 Justice Stevens has used the war metaphor sarcastically: "No impartial observer
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the prosecutor's response in McKeehan: "[W]e do have a war
against drugs."15 This rebuttal, though brief, should be held
improper because it is inflammatory and calls upon the patriotic
allegiance of jurors.
CONCLUSION

A court should not allow prosecutors to use rhetoric invoking
the images of battle during opening and closing argument of a
narcotics trial. The Supreme Court and several lower courts have
recognized the danger of military rhetoric. Courts have also noted
the dangers of drug-related rhetoric. The use of "War on Drugs"
rhetoric creates a risk that jurors will make decisions based on
emotions, allegiance to the government, and matters not in evidence. The prosecutor's use of "War on Drugs" language also
suggests that the prosecutor has abandoned her duty to avoid
striking rhetorical foul blows.
An effective way to reduce the use of "War on Drugs" rhetoric is to forbid prosecutors from invoking the metaphors and
images of battle during opening and closing argument of a narcotics trial. This per se prohibition would be easy to apply, would
not be easily evaded, would improve the training of prosecutors,
and would resolve a significant number of cases. This ban should
apply regardless of the rules governing the scope of defense
counsel's argument.

could criticize this Court for hindering the progress of the war on drugs .... [T]his Court
has become a loyal foot soldier in the Executive's fight against crime." California v
Acevedo, 111 S Ct 1982, 2002 (1991) (Stevens dissenting). This distinction between using
the metaphor to promote calm thinking and using the metaphor to increase emotions is
also apparent outside of the courtroom. For example, opponents of current government
policy have used the slogan "war is not a domestic policy," which is different from the
more common phrase, "we are at war with drugs." Drug Policy FoundationAdvertisement,
Wired 137 (Jan 1994).
" McKeehan, 824 SW2d at 155.

